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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Crystal Elizabeth Turner appeals from the district court’s order granting the state’s motion
to summarily dismiss all the claims in her petition for post-conviction relief.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
As set forth in the state’s “Statement of Claimed Undisputed Material Facts in Support of
Motion for Summary Dismissal” in Turner’s post-conviction case, the underlying criminal case
proceeded as follows:
The petitioner Crystal Turner was charged in CR 2015-1600 by Complaint
with Count I: Murder in the First Degree and Count II: Conspiracy to Commit
Robbery. An Amended Complaint was filed March 31, 2015, and a Second
Amended Complaint was filed April 3, 2015, each retaining the same charges. An
Information was filed April 7, 2015, charging the petitioner with Count I: Murder
in the First Degree and Count II: Conspiracy to Commit Robbery. An Amended
Information filed [sic] April 10, 2015 with the same charges. An Amended
Information filed September 9, 2015 amended the charge against the petitioner to
Aid/Abet Murder in the First Degree.
Pursuant to plea negotiations, Turner pled guilty to Count I,
Aiding/Abetting First Degree Murder, stipulated to a sentence of 10 years to life to
serve, and waived her right to appeal.
Turner was sentenced on November 19, 2015 to serve a unified sentence of
life, comprised of a fixed period of confinement of 10 years followed by an
indeterminate period of custody of up to life.
(R., pp.89-90 (internal citations omitted).) Turner did not file a direct appeal. (See iCourt internet
site: “http://icourt.idaho.gov” entry for Twin Falls County Case No. CR-2015-1600, “Events and
Hearings.”)
Turner timely filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief (R., pp.6-10) and a
supporting affidavit (R., pp.11-12), presenting several claims. After Turner’s motion for appointed
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counsel was granted (R., pp.24-25), Turner’s counsel filed an amended petition presenting the
following claims:
1.

Turner’s “guilty plea was not made freely and voluntarily” because it was
coerced by her trial counsel’s threat to withdraw from her case “if she did
not enter into the proposed plea agreement.” (R., p.60.)

2.

Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to provide requested
videotape footage, all interviews and all discovery to Turner. This also
caused Turner’s decision to plead guilty to be unknowing, involuntary and
unintelligent. (Id.)

3.

Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to present in Turner’s
defense or in mitigation: (1) co-defendant William McGrath’s threats to
harm Turner and her children, and (2) that “a gun was pointed at [Turner’s]
head at the scene of the crime[.]” (R., pp.60-61.)

4.

Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to present at sentencing:
(1) William McGrath’s threats, (2) that Turner had “a gun held to her[,]”
and (3) that Turner “was the one who voluntarily went to the police to tell
them about the crime.” (R., p.61.)

The state filed an Answer (R., pp.69-71) and a Motion for Summary Disposition with a
supporting brief (R., pp.67-68, 72-88). Turner filed a response brief (R., pp.189-195) and an
affidavit on her own behalf with an attached note allegedly from William McGrath which reads,
“Crystal remember what I said I don’t leave any witnesses behind” (R., pp.196-199 (verbatim)).
The district court held a hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal and granted the
state’s motion in an oral ruling at the end of that hearing. (See generally 1/30/17 Tr.; R., p.208.1)
The district court entered a Judgment dismissing Turner’s petition for post-conviction relief on
February 3, 2017. (R., pp.209-210.)

Turner filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.211-213,

222-227.)
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Although the district court ordered the state to prepare an order and a judgment of dismissal, the
record on appeal only includes a judgment. (1/30/17 Tr. p.24, Ls.4-8; see R., pp.209-210.)
2

ISSUE
Turner states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Ms. Turner’s amended
petition for post-conviction relief?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)
The state phrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Turner failed to establish error in the district court’s summary dismissal of her
amended petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
Turner Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court’s Summary Dismissal Of Her
Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Turner argues that the district court erred by summarily dismissing her amended

petition because there were genuine issues as to whether her “trial counsel was ineffective for”:
(1) “failing to investigate her co-defendant’s threats,” (2) “allowing her to enter a guilty plea after
being threatened by her co-defendant,”2 and (3) “coercing her to plead guilty by threatening to
withdraw from the case.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.6.) Turner’s arguments fail.
B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary

hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings,
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file ….” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho
518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787,
791 (2002)).
Error is never presumed on appeal. The appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error on
the record; the appellate court will not review the record in search of it. Woods v. Crouse, 101
Idaho 764, 620 P.2d 798 (1980); State v. Knight, 128 Idaho 862, 865, 920 P.2d 78, 81 (Ct. App.
1996). Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules of appellate procedure as are parties

2

Neither Turner’s amended petition nor her original Affidavit of Facts in Support of PostConviction Petition allege that her trial counsel was ineffective for allowing her to plead guilty
while being coerced by her co-defendant. (See R., pp.11-12, 59-62.) After the state filed its motion
to summarily dismiss the amended petition (R., pp.67-71), Turner filed an affidavit (R., pp.196198) which indirectly made such an allegation. In its oral decision granting the state’s motion for
summary dismissal, the district court appears to have addressed that allegation. (See 1/30/17 Tr.,
p.22, L.18 – p.23, L.6.)
4

appealing through counsel. State v. Sima, 98 Idaho 643, 644, 570 P.2d 1333, 1334 (1977); see
also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975) (“[t]he right of self-representation is not
... a license not to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law”).
C.

This Court Should Decline To Consider Turner’s Argument That Her Trial Counsel Was
Ineffective For Failing To Investigate Her Co-Defendant’s Threats Because It Was Not
Presented Below And It Is Not Supported With Argument And Authority On Appeal
In her first argument on appeal, Turner contends her “trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate her co-defendant’s threats made during and after the commission of the
crime.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.8 (emphasis added).) Turner’s amended petition states that, while
at the site of the crime, William McGrath threatened her and her children with harm, and that he
later made threats to her in a letter she provided to her trial counsel. (R., p.60.) Her amended
petition further states that she “informed trial counsel that a gun was pointed at [her] head at the
scene of the crime . . . .” (R., pp.60-61.) Although her amended petition does not specifically say
who pointed a gun at her head, Turner explained during her plea colloquy that it was a “third
party,” a Mexican male, who “had a gun on [her]” while McGrath “had two guns to the bathroom
door.” (R., p.145 (Tr., p.23, Ls.3-13).)
None of the four claims in Turner’s amended petition allege that her trial counsel was
ineffective for not investigating the threats made by William McGrath or a “third party.” (See R.,
pp.60-61.) Although Claims 3 and 4 allege that Turner’s trial counsel failed to present evidence
of McGrath’s threats in her defense or in mitigation (Claim 3) and in sentencing (Claim 4), those
claims do not mention any failure on trial counsel’s part to investigate or discover the nature of
the threats. Indeed, Turner seems to acknowledge that her trial counsel knew full well about the
threats. (See Appellant’s Brief, p.8 (“despite knowing that her co-defendant had threatened her
not only during the commission of the crime, but also while she was in jail”); p.9 (stating Turner
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gave trial counsel “one of Mr. McGrath’s letters containing threats to her and her family while she
was incarcerated[,]” and “[d]espite this information of Ms. Turner’s coercion or duress . . . the
threats to her and her family after the crime, her trial counsel still threatened to withdraw from her
case[.]”).)
It is well-settled that Idaho’s appellate courts “will not consider issues not raised in the
court below.” State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833, 252 P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing
State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 504 (1992)). The district court did not have
the opportunity to review Turner’s “failure to investigate” claim, and it was her burden to raise
claims before the trial court. Because Turner failed to preserve her first claim of error for appellate
review, it is waived and should not be considered by this Court.
Even if Turner’s amended petition claimed that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to investigate the threats made by Turner’s co-defendants, and the district court summarily
dismissed that claim, this Court should refuse to review such claim.

Although Turner’s

Appellant’s Brief makes two introductory statements that her trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate her co-defendant’s threats (see Appellant’s Brief, p.6 (introduction to three
arguments on appeal), p.8 (introduction to claim of “coerced guilty plea”)), it says nothing more
about her trial counsel’s failure to investigate the threats; it does not explain what Turner’s trial
counsel did or did not do to investigate the claim, what additional information more investigation
might have revealed, or how such information (if found) would have affected Turner’s decision to
plead guilty. (See generally Appellant’s Brief.)
Because Turner fails to present argument, authority, or both, in regard to the propriety of
the district court’s summary dismissal of her first claim (as per her rendition of it on appeal), her
argument that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate her co-defendant’s threats
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should not be considered on appeal. In State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996), the
Idaho Supreme Court held:
When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or
argument, they will not be considered. Earlier formulations of this rule stated that
an issue was waived if it was not supported with argument and authority. A party
waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just
if both are lacking. Zichko supported this assignment of error with argument but
no authority. Consequently, he waived this issue on appeal.
Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970 (citations omitted).
Inasmuch as Turner has failed to present this Court with argument and authority to
challenge the district court’s summary dismissal of the above-described claim, pursuant to Zichko,
she has waived that issue and this Court should not consider it on appeal.
D.

Turner Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of Her Claims That Her
Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Allowing Her To Plead Guilty After She Was
Threatened By Her Co-Defendant And By Coercing Her To Plead Guilty By Threatening
To Withdraw From The Case
1.

Legal Standards Applicable To Summary Dismissal And Claims Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction
relief in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative. “To withstand summary
dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to
each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831,
833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal “if the
applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact” as to each element of the petitioner’s
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace,
140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.
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While a court must accept a petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not
required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802
(citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). The trial court is not required
to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, even if
true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief. Id. (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801
P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). “Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do
not justify relief as a matter of law.” Id. In Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, 536, 348 P.3d 145,
151 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court further explained:
“[W]here the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury
will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the
conflict between those inferences.” [State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d
123, 136 (2008)] (quoting State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482
(2008)). Moreover, the trial judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of
the party opposing a summary judgment motion. Instead, “the trial judge is free to
arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary
facts.” Id.
To overcome summary dismissal of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner
must demonstrate that “(1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel’s performance was
deficient, and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced [the
petitioner’s] case.” Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008)
(internal citations omitted); see
also Strickland
v.- Washington,
- --------- - - - - - - 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (a
petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient performance and
resulting prejudice). In the general context of ineffective assistance of counsel affecting the plea,
the petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
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would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations omitted). “Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of
claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have
been rational under the circumstances.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing Roe
v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)).
2.

Turner Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of Her Claims Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel

On appeal, Turner argues that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her
trial counsel was ineffective (1) for allowing her to plead guilty even though she was threatened
by her co-defendant, and (2) by threatening to withdraw from her case if she did not accept the
plea offer. (Appellant’s Brief, p.6.) Turner contends there was a genuine factual issue because
the averments she made in her affidavits and amended petition about being coerced to plead guilty
were contrary to her plea hearing testimony and sentencing hearing statements in which she said
her plea was voluntary. (Id., pp.11-13.) Turner concludes that “[t]he extent of her coercion, the
precise threats made by her co-defendant and trial counsel, and Ms. Turner’s credibility are all
questions for an evidentiary hearing.” (Id., pp.11-13.) Turner’s argument fails.
Applying the foregoing legal principles, the district court clearly articulated why Turner
failed to show entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on her claims that her trial counsel was
ineffective for allowing her to plead guilty after she was threatened by her co-defendant and by
coercing her to plead guilty by threatening to withdraw from the case. The district court concluded
that these claims were affirmatively disproved by the record, explaining:
Based upon that [summary dismissal] standard, the Court will hereby
summarily dismiss Ms. Turner’s petition. I find that her seeking post-conviction
relief for the four allegations set forth in the amended application filed June 2, 2016,
is contradicted by the record in nearly every respect and/or her claims of inefficient
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[sic] assistance of counsel as against [defense counsel] failed to meet the Strickland
standard that is that his ineffective assistance, had it not occurred, would have led
to a different result.
She argues or asserted that her guilty plea was not made freely and
voluntarily, and she insisted on jury trial, and that her trial counsel threatened to
withdraw from her case if she did not enter into the plea agreement. As was pointed
out, that issue was referenced by Judge Stoker directly and in detail, not only on
the record, but also in the plea form that is submitted where she submits under oath
that what she is saying is accurate, and thereby that [she] had not been threatened
by counsel. And the record, therefore, belies her claims now that Mr. Roark’s
indication that he would withdraw if she didn’t take the plea is reason to set this
aside.
Under Strickland, there’s no showing been made to my satisfaction that
even if [defense counsel] made comment [sic] that “You’re either going to take the
deal or I’m out of here” was sufficient to change this, particularly, with her
language that she gave to Judge Stoker on the record.
....
The third claim is for threats from codefendant William McGrath. I, again,
find that the record belies that in terms of what Judge Stoker brought out from her,
but also the Strickland prong of a different result is simply belied by the logic of
the alleged threats, that, in fact, if she were being threatened to keep her mouth shut,
pleading guilty was the last thing that she would probably do in that situation. And
rather than going to trial, if she is threatened that she was not to take a plea, it
doesn’t seem that any harm came to her from taking this plea and thereby receiving
the very minimum sentencing that she could receive.
(1/30/17 Tr., p.21, L.7 – p.23, L.6 (explanations added).) Review of the record shows that the
district court was correct.
In the signed Rule 11 Plea Agreement,3 Turner agreed that she had “no reservations about
the nature or quality of the representation of her attorney of record, and claim[ed] no incapacity to
enter into th[e] agreement based upon coercion, undue influence of any person, or any sort of
diminished mental or emotional capacity.” (R., p.153.) Turner also agreed in writing “that her

3

This Court’s Order Granting Motion for Judicial Notice, dated August 14, 2017, took judicial
notice of, inter alia, Turner’s Rule 11 Plea Agreement, filed September 9, 2015.
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decision to enter into this Plea Agreement and to tender a plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily
made and is not the result of force, threats, assurances, promises . . . .” (Id.) At the plea entry
hearing, Turner reaffirmed, under oath, that she was satisfied with her attorney’s performance, that
her attorney had not told her that she must accept the plea offer and had not coerced her to do so,
that no one had unduly influenced or coerced her to enter a guilty plea, and that nothing affected
her ability to voluntarily enter a guilty plea. (R., pp.129-132 (Tr., p.7, L.19 – p.8, L.10; p.9, L.8 –
p.10, L.6).) However, when asked if anyone had threatened her to enter a plea, Turner held an
off-the-record discussion with her attorney, after which the following dialog took place:
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, just so the record will properly reflect what’s
going on here, there may have been some threats within the jail involving another
defendant, but they aren’t threats to plead guilty, and that’s what had my client
somewhat confused.
THE COURT: Somebody has made threats to her on unrelated matters? Is that
what you’re saying? I don’t want to get into the details.
[Defense Counsel]: I would not say unrelated. I would say that the threats did not
go to the impetus behind accepting the plea agreement.
THE COURT: Okay. What I’m getting at, Ms. Turner, very simply, is this: It’s
very important that you’re making a voluntary decision here today. If somebody
has threatened you, and you don’t want to do this, then I guess I need to know about
that.
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I’m okay with the plea. The only thing that, you know,
would stop me be [sic] would the felony murder rule. That’s the only thing that’s
stopping me from wanting to take it further, to be honest with you, it’s the Idaho
state law.
(R., pp.132-133 (Tr., p.10, L.12 – p.133, L.7).) After Turner’s trial counsel explained that the
“requisites for the felony murder rule are in place, and there’s nothing we can do about that[,]”
Turner told the court that she agreed with her attorney’s statements. (R., pp.133-134 (Tr., p.11,
L.14 – p.12, L.5).)
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In short, at the plea entry hearing, Turner reaffirmed under oath her Rule 11 Plea
Agreement’s statements that she had not been coerced or unduly influenced by anyone to enter
into a guilty plea – including her co-defendant and her trial counsel. Also, after the issue of her
co-defendant’s threats were brought to the court’s attention, Turner’s trial counsel said, “but they
aren’t threats to plead guilty,” and that they “did not go to the impetus behind accepting the plea
agreement.”

(R., p.132 (Tr., p.10, Ls.12-16, 20-22).)

Those statements support the post-

conviction court’s determination that, “if [Turner] were being threatened to keep her mouth shut
[by her co-defendant], pleading guilty was the last thing that she would probably do in that
situation[,]” and if she was threatened “not to take a plea, it doesn’t seem that any harm came to
her from taking this plea and thereby receiving the very minimum sentencing that she could
receive.” (1/30/17 Tr., p.22, L.19 – p.23, L.6 (explanation added).)
Turner’s sentencing hearing also belies her claims that her trial counsel was ineffective for
allowing her to plead guilty after she received threats from her co-defendant, and by counsel’s
threat to withdraw from her case if she rejected the Rule 11 plea agreement. First, Turner’s trial
counsel clarified that Turner’s comment to the presentence investigator about feeling “coerced”
into pleading guilty was “because of the application of the felony murder rule from the incipiency
of this case.” (R., p.102 (Tr. p.4, Ls.3-11).) Turner represented to the court that (1) “no one,
including [her] attorney ha[d] forced [her] or coerced [her] in any way to accept this guilty plea”
(R., p.106 (Tr., p.8, Ls.4-8)); (2) she had no reservations about the nature or quality of her
attorney’s representation, and “claim[ed] no incapacity to enter the agreement based upon
coercion, undue influence of any person” (R., pp.108-109 (Tr., p.10, L.16 – p.11, L.7)); (3) nothing
affected her “ability to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter [the] guilty plea” (R., p.109
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(Tr., p.11, Ls.21-25)); and (4) she did not want to withdraw her guilty plea (R., pp.110-111 (Tr.,
p.12, L.10 – p.13, L.4)).
In sum, in her statements to the trial court during her sentencing hearing, during her plea
entry hearing (under oath), and in her Rule 11 Plea Agreement, Turner consistently denied that she
was coerced by anyone into pleading guilty, and that her trial counsel’s performance was not
satisfactory. Accordingly, the record belies Turner’s claims that her trial counsel was ineffective
because (1) he allowed her to plead guilty knowing she was coerced by her co-defendant’s threats,
and (2) he coerced her into pleading guilty by threatening to withdraw from the case if she did not
accept the plea offer – both of which are based on her underlying allegation that she was coerced
into pleading guilty.
Here, Turner’s allegations that her co-defendant threatened her and her trial counsel
threatened to withdraw from the case if she rejected the plea offer – even if undisputed4 – do not
create a genuine issue of material fact about whether her guilty plea was actually coerced. Turner
is not entitled to manufacture a genuine issue of material fact by making self-serving averments in
a post-conviction proceeding that are directly contrary to her many statements and testimony to
the trial court. The district court was well within its authority to reject Turner’s allegations that
she pled guilty due to coercion. See Adams, 158 Idaho at 536, 348 P.3d at 151 (“[W]here the
evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact,

4

There is no indication that the district court or the state doubted the authenticity of the “short
note” Crystal Turner said she received from William McGrath, which read, “Crystal remember
what I said I don’t leave any witnesses behind.” (See R., pp.196-199.) The district court also
explained that even if Turner’s defense counsel threatened, “You’re either going to take the deal
or I’m out of here,” Turner made no showing that such comment “was sufficient to change this,”
in reference to the prejudice requirement of Strickland. (1/30/17 Tr., p.22, Ls.7-13.)
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summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the
court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences.”).
The district court correctly held that the record belied the foundational assertion of Turner’s
“ineffectiveness” claims – that her guilty plea was coerced. The court reviewed the record and
properly concluded that, regardless of her belated claims otherwise, Turner’s guilty plea was not
coerced by either her co-defendant or her trial counsel. Therefore, the court correctly held that
summary dismissal was appropriate because Turner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
did not present a genuine issue of material fact.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s order summarily
dismissing Turner’s post-conviction petition.
DATED this 2nd day of November, 2017.

__/s/ John C. McKinney_________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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